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I. INTRODUCTION
They are admission tickets to venture capital markets.' They are
often used by investors and creditors, 2 and they affect almost every busi-
ness decision made.3 The importance of audits4 can scarcely be over-
stated. Occasionally, however, businesses that have received "clean"'
audit reports fail, leaving creditors and investors holding the bag.6 In
such cases, the creditors and investors tend to view business failures as
audit failures.' This foreseeable group of nonclient third parties often
1. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 382, 834 P.2d 745, 751, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
51, 57, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
2. Id.
3. Faron R. Webb, Note, New York Upholds Ultramares and Delineates Three-Part Test
Which Noncontractual Parties Must Satisfy to Hold Accountants Liable in Negligence: Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435
(1985), 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1986).
4. An audit is an independent inquiry designed to determine how fairly an entity's finan-
cial statements, taken as a whole, represent the entity's actual financial position. William C.
Sturm, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 92 Com. L.J. 158, 159 (1987); see infra part
II.A.4.
5. A clean audit report refers to an auditor's statement that the client's financial state-
ments, taken as a whole, fairly represent its financial condition. See infra part II.A.4.
6. During the 1980s, many businesses and financial institutions failed. These failures, in
turn, had an enormous impact on the nation's financial markets. Erica B. Baird, Legal Liabil-
ity Under the Expectation Gap Statements on Auditing Standards, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABIL-
rry 1991, at 63, 65 (Dan L. Goldwasser ed., 1991). Some of these business failures occurred in
spite of clean audit opinions that had been issued by independent auditors. Id. "These events
prompted a series of questions about the role of the auditors and why they had failed to give
adequate warning of the institution's imminent failure.... [Tihe public asked: 'where were the
auditors?'" Id
7. Nancy Chaffee, Comment, The Role and Responsibility ofAccountants in Today's Soci-
ety, 13 J. CORP. L. 863, 882 (1988) (citing Joseph E. Connor, Enhancing Public Confidence in
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includes corporate directors, officers, shareholders, trustees, receivers,
sureties and employees who wish to recoup their losses from the auditor8
by claiming that the auditor breached a duty owed to them.9
The explosion of suits filed against auditors for negligence, negligent
misrepresentation and fraud in the past decade attests to the significance
of these suits. During the past ten years, the number of lawsuits filed
against accountants has dramatically increased,10 as has the amount of
damages sought."1
The increase in litigation has made it difficult, if not impossible, for
some accountants to obtain professional liability insurance.12 Between
1985 and 1986 every major insurance carrier stopped writing liability in-
surance policies for California accountants. 13 Premiums in California
have skyrocketed, increasing approximately 1480% since 1984,11 despite
the profession's efforts to keep premiums down by creating and running
the Accounting Profession, J. AcCr., July 1986, at 76, 76-77). In Bily, the court recognized
this when it stated:
The auditing CPA has no expertise in or control over the products or services of its
clients or their markets; it does not choose the client's executives or make its business
decisions; yet, when clients fail financially, the CPA auditor is a prime target in liti-
gation claiming investor and creditor economic losses because it is the only available
(and solvent) entity that had any direct contact with the client's business affairs.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 401, 834 P.2d 745, 763, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 69
(citing John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1929, 1932-33 (1988)), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
8. Although there are distinctions within the profession between "auditors" and "ac-
countants," this Note will use the terms interchangeably.
9. See Joey D. Duke, Note, Accountants'Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepre-
sentation: Should There be a Uniform Standard?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 133 (1990).
10. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 31, Bily (No. H003 695). The frequency of claims against auditors in
California have increased at a faster rate than in the rest of the United States. Id. As of 1987
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) insurance carrier was faced
with 1.77 times as many claims per insured firm in California than in the rest of the country.
Iat Additionally, between 1978 and 1990 there were more lawsuits against auditors than in the
entire previous history of the profession. Samuel S. Paschall, Accountants' Liability, TRIAL,
May 1990, at 42.
11. Rick Telberg, Turning the Tide on Liability, Accr. TODAY, Sept. 7, 1992, at 1. Be-
tween January and September 1992, Big Six accounting firms incurred court judgments total-
ling almost $1 billion. Id. A negligence verdict for $332 million handed down against Price
Waterhouse was included within this amount. John E. Morris, State High Court Limits
Claims Against Auditors, RECORDER, Aug. 28, 1992, at 1.
12. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
13. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 34. Some insurers will not write policies for firms with more than five
accountants. Id. at 35. Others will not insure firms that perform audits. Id.
14. IM. In fact, some accountants who perform audits in connection with savings and
loans or public offerings must pay an additional premium. Id. In addition, litigation costs for
accounting firms topped 10% of audit income as of September 1992. Telberg, supra note 11, at
1.
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its own non-profit carrier. 5 Meanwhile, the extent of coverage has
steadily eroded.
16
Within this context, it is hardly surprising that more than half of the
approximately 7000 accounting firms that are members of the California
Society of Certified Public Accountants are uninsured. 17 The Society es-
timates that due to high insurance premiums and shrinking coverages,
forty-one percent of accounting firms no longer perform audits and sev-
enty-six percent will not do audits for forecasts, projections or public
offerings.18 Only five percent of California accounting firms will do any
audit work for financial institutions.19
Although the entire professional liability insurance crisis cannot be
attributed to any one factor,20 court decisions expanding auditor liability
are one major reason for the current crisis.2
Courts have adopted three different rules for determining if a non-
client has standing to sue for negligently audited financial statements: (1)
the privity rule, which generally allows only clients to recover;22 (2) the
foreseeability rule, which allows any reasonably foreseeable party to re-
cover as long as the party reasonably relied on the audit;23 and (3) the
15. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 34. After some insurance companies began to leave the California
market, the California Society of Certified Public Accountants created its own carrier, the
California Accountants Mutual Insurance Company. Id. In addition to the draconian in-
crease in premiums, the scope of coverage has decreased markedly. For example, the maxi-
mum coverage of $5 million per firm fell to $1 million in 1983 and is now only $3 million. Id.
16. Moreover, policy limits include litigation expenses, which further reduces the extent of
coverage. Id at 34-35.
17. See id at 36; see also Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., Accountants'Liability in an Indeterminate
Amount for an Indeterminate Time to an Indeterminate Class: An Analysis of Touche Ross &
Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 57 Miss. L.J. 379, 414 (1987) ("Insurance premiums for
CPAs have increased by a factor of five since 1984 while deductibles have increased many
times over. One out of five CPA firms responding to a recent survey indicated that it had been
forced to drop its insurance coverage." (citing As Accounting Firms Premiums Soar, Some
Might Drop Liability Insurance, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1985, at 17)). But see Mark Nelson,
Risky Business: Professional Liability Exposure on the Rise, OUTLOOK, Fall 1990, at 36, 37-38
(stating that 40-50% of accounting firms in California are uninsured).
18. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 38.
19. Id.
20. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987) (describing various factors contributing to liability insurance crisis).
Part of the reason that tort liability could increase liability insurance rates is that California
"juries tend to compensate victims more readily and generously than other states." Nelson,
supra note 17, at 38.
21. See Abraham, supra note 20, for a discussion of other factors contributing to the liabil-
ity insurance crisis.
22. See infra part II.B.l.a.
23. See infra part II.B.l.b.
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approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552, which allows
an audit's intended beneficiaries to recover.2 4
In 1986 a California court of appeal adopted the foreseeability rule,
holding that an auditor is liable to all those who reasonably and
foreseeably rely on an audit opinion.25 This decision expanded the scope
of auditor liability in California. 6
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. ,27 however, the California Supreme
Court rejected the foreseeability rule and created several bright-line rules
to limit the scope of an auditor's liability to third parties. 28 The court
ruled that an accountant's duty of care extends only to his or her client
for professional negligence 29 and only to an audit's intended beneficiary
for negligent misrepresentation.30 The decision did not change the com-
mon-law rule that any party who foreseeably relies on a fraudulent repre-
sentation may recover.31
Since the 1960s, the California Supreme Court has fashioned new
rules to expand tort liability.32 In fact, since its decision in Biakanja v.
Irving 33 thirty-five years ago, the court has continually rejected the priv-
ity rule for negligence actions against professional suppliers of informa-
tion.34 Bily is a departure from that course. It is a significant decision
not merely because it has redrawn the lines of auditor liability to non-
client third parties, but, as importantly, it has redefined who will bear the
24. See infra part II.B.2.
25. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834
P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
26. See Ann Simmons, International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.:
Third Party Liability-Accountants Beware, 18 PAC. L.J. 1055, 1066 (1987).
27. 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
28. Id. at 416, 834 P.2d at 774, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80.
29. Id. at 406, 834 P.2d at 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
30. Id. at 408, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74. Language in the opinion was so
strong that "it startled even officials at the California Society of CPAs." Telberg, supra note
11, at 41.
31. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 415, 834 P.2d at 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
32. Stephen R. Barnett, The Rose Bird Myth, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 85; see also
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (holding defendant
manufacturers liable based on their market share), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (holding
manufacturer strictly liable in tort to third party when defective product put into market
causes injury); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding notary public
liable to nonclient third party for negligence).
33. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
34. See id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19 (adopting balancing test to determine whether nonclient
third parties may sue notary public for negligence); see also Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d
335, 342, 556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976) (applying balancing test of policy
factors to determine whether nonclient third parties may sue attorney for negligence).
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cost associated with third-party use of the audit report.35 One commen-
tator has noted that Bily is likely to fundamentally change the manner in
which accountants, and those who rely on audited financial statements,
do business.3 6 For example, before the Bily decision, a reasonably fore-
seeable third party could sue an auditor for negligence.37 To pay for the
expenses associated with exposure to liability, auditors presumably ab-
sorbed the costs or passed them on to their clients. After Bily, the bur-
den of financial responsibility shifted.38  To recover damages, a third
party who intends to rely on audited financial statements must inform
the auditor about its intended reliance and the nature of the contem-
plated transaction.39
This Note explains the nature and functions of an audit and presents
the divergent approaches courts have taken to define the group of per-
sons to whom auditors owe a duty of care.' Next, it discusses the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. and its
implications on auditor liability to third parties.41 Finally, this Note rec-
ommends that the California Legislature codify Bily and the standards of
care developed within the accounting profession.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Audit Process
1. Financial statements
Before an audit is performed, the client gives the auditor a copy of
its financial statements, which portray assets, liabilities and equity.42 Fi-
35. See infra part IV.B.I. In this respect, Bily is consistent with other recent California
Supreme Court decisions. One commentator has noted that:
The present court has slowed the steady growth of expanding liability, damages and
insurance coverage. In part, this appears to be based upon recognition that greater
tort and insurance remedies entail corresponding costs to the community, often in
the form of higher prices or decreased availability of beneficial products and services.
Ellis Horvitz, An Analysis of Recent California Supreme Court Developments in Tort and Insur-
ance Law: The Common-Law Tradition, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1145 (1993).
36. M. Laurence Popofsky et al., The Professional Community Can Sigh with Relief for
'Bily,' L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 27, 1992, at 7. For a discussion of Bily's ramifications on commer-
cial transactions, see infra part V.A.1.
37. See, eg., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986) (holding that reasonably foreseeable third
parties could recover against accountant for negligence), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
38. See infra part IV.B.1.
39. See infra part IV.B.1.
40. See infra part II.
41. See infra part III.
42. Dan L. Goldwasser, Glossary of Terms, in AccoUNTANTs' LIABILITY 1992, at 73, 77
(Dan L. Goldwasser ed. 1992).
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nancial statements do not contain records of every financial transaction
and are not meant to include all information investors and creditors may
find pertinent.43 If they did, they would be too unwieldy to be useful."
Additionally, although financial statements are a compilation of num-
bers, they do not necessarily reflect exact values.4 Analysis of financial
statements, therefore, depends on the informed professional judgment of
the auditor."
Even though an auditor may be held liable for negligently auditing a
client's financial statements, courts have long recognized that the client,
and not the auditor, is responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of rep-
resentations made in the financial statements.47 If a client has "cooked
its books,"48 the auditor generally cannot be held liable for failing to
detect material misrepresentations in them as long as the auditor com-
plied with professional standards.4 9
2. The audit
Before an audit begins, the accountant usually prepares an "engage-
ment letter" that specifies the duties and responsibilities of the parties.50
During an audit, the auditor examines the client's tangible assets, con-
firms account balances, and traces 5I and vouches5 2 transactions. In addi-
tion, the auditor scrutinizes internal controls for weaknesses based on
evidence acquired from statistical sampling, and seeks to ensure that no
43. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.) (stating that financial statements
summarize financial position rather than recite all information third parties might want to
know before lending or investing), cert denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); Carl D. Liggio, The
Expectation Gap: The Accountant's Legal Waterloo?, 3 J. CONTEMP. Bus. 27, 38 (1974).
44. One commentator has noted that an overabundance of information in financial state-
ments would lead to "a hopeless morass of irrelevant data.., from which one will be unable to
draw any logical conclusions." Liggio, supra note 43, at 38.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 30.
47. See SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 924 (1973).
48. In other words, a client intentionally overstates its assets or understates its liabilities.
49. Although this is the general rule, there are exceptions. For example, in Bily, even
though the auditors complied with professional standards, they were held to different stan-
dards, which were articulated in their internal auditing manuals. See infra part IV.B.2.
50. GEORGE SPELLMIRE ET AL., AccOuNTANTs LEGAL LIABILrrY GUIDE 1.16 (1990);
Travis M. Dodd, Comment, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justifying
Disparate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 GEO. L.J. 909, 913 (1992).
51. Tracing is the process whereby an auditor tracks a particular transaction through the
client's accounting and bookkeeping process to determine whether it has been properly ac-
counted for and recorded. Willis W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Mal-
practice: Effect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 67 n.15 (1987).
52. Vouching is the process of determining whether transactions are supported by the un-
derlying data. Id.
June 1993] 1341
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material misrepresentations exist in the client's financial statements.5 3 In
this endeavor, an auditor rarely reviews every recorded transaction.5 4 To
do so would be prohibitively expensive and would not significantly im-
prove the reliability of the audit. 5 For this reason, planning and execut-
ing the audit depends on the auditor's professional skill and judgment.5 6
3. The auditor's role
Creditors and investors often use audit reports.5 7 The capital-seek-
ing audit client hopes the opinion will add to its financial statements the
credibility necessary to gain access to financial markets.5"
At one time, accountants were not considered to have any special
responsibility to the general public. 5 9  More recently, however, the
United States Supreme Court compared auditors to watchdogs to empha-
size their public responsibility.' ° Thus, while clients commission audits,
the auditor's role transcends that of an employee or independent contrac-
tor. An auditor is required to maintain a degree of independence. 61
53. 1d, at 67, 68 n.21.
54. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 380, 834 P.2d 745, 749, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
51, 55, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See infra note 62.
58. See infra note 62.
59. In his majority opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Judge Cardozo argued that
accountants are public "only in the sense that their services are offered to any one who chooses
to employ them," not in the sense that the "services [are] rendered in the pursuit of an in-
dependent calling, characterized as public" and giving rise to the duty of care for the public's
benefit. 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931).
60. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984). Accountants bitterly oppose this characterization. Nelson, supra note 17, at 46. One
commentator noted that characterizing auditors as watchdogs "almost assumes that we have a
responsibility to the entire world-that there could be an infinite number of potential plain-
tiffs." Id at 44 (quoting Wanda Giner, former Chair, California Society of CPAs Amicus
Curiae Brief Task Force). In addition, Ms. Girner noted that "you can't operate in the busi-
ness world with that kind of uncertainty." Id. (quoting Wanda Ginner, former Chair, Califor-
nia Society of CPAs Amicus Curiae Brief Task Force).
61. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
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Because third parties use and rely on audit reports,62 auditors are
vulnerable to suits by them.6 3 Significantly, some defenses the auditor
may use against the client-such as contributory negligence and compar-
ative negligence-may not be used against third parties. 64 Thus, an audi-
tor's potential liability to third parties may be far greater than the risk he
or she faces from a client.65
4. The audit report
At the conclusion of an audit, an auditor will issue an opinion or
audit report. The report states whether the client's financial statements,
taken as a whole, fairly represent the client's financial condition.66 There
are four types of audit reports: (1) an unqualified, or "clean," opinion;67
62. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 383, 834 P.2d 745, 751, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 51, 57, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992). Audits are "a principle means of communicating
accounting information to those outside an enterprise." Id. (quoting Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts of the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the AICPA No. 1, 6,
at 7); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5051(d) (West 1990) (stating that accounting prac-
tice involves auditing third-party financial statements for purposes of obtaining credit). See
generally John S. Dzienkowski, Accountants' Liability for Compilation and Review Engage-
ments, 60 TEx. L. Rnv. 759, 773 (1982) (stating that third parties are primary users of audit
reports).
63. See Nelson, supra note 17, at 44.
64. SPELLMIRE ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.14.
65. Id.
66. John A. Silieiano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform,
86 MIcH. L. REv. 1929, 1931 (1988). Under California law, an auditor is required to give an
opinion on a client's financial statements:
This rule applies to the accountant's report issued in connection with examina-
tions of financial statements that are intended to present financial position, results of
operations and changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion re-
garding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an
opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the rea-
sons should be stated.
CAL. CODE REaGS. tit. 16, § 58.1 (1990).
67. An unqualified opinion will state "'[t]he financial statements present fairly the finan-
cial position, results of operations and changes in financial position in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles consistently applied.'" Sturm, supra note 4, at 161
(quoting American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statements on Accounting and
Review No. 1 (codified in AICPA 2 Professional Standards § 509.28 (CCH 1984))).
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(2) a qualified opinion;68 (3) an adverse opinion;6 9 and (4) a disclaimer of
opinion. 7°
Although a "clean" opinion means the auditor reasonably believes
the financial statements fairly present the client's financial condition, it
does not mean that the client has been issued a "clean bill of health.
'71
Nor does an audit report expressly guarantee that the audited financial
statements accurately reflect the client's financial situation. 72 Rather, the
audit report simply means that the audit has been conducted in accord-
ance with the relevant auditing and accounting standards and the auditor
therefore believes that the client's financial statements fairly present its
financial position.73
5. The expectation gap: Auditing as art or science?
The public and accountants view audits very differently. This rift is
called the "expectation gap."'74 The public tends to believe that an audi-
tor has the duty to search for and detect fraud. 75 Although an auditor
may be engaged specifically to search for fraud, in the usual engagement
the auditor is hired merely to uncover "errors and irregularities" in the
client's financial statements. 76 Although the detection of fraud may be a
68. An auditor issues a qualified opinion if the auditor lacks sufficient evidence to uncondi-
tionally support the client's financial statements or if the audit was limited in scope. Id.
69. An auditor issues an adverse opinion if there have been material departures from gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), or if the auditor is uncertain whether the finan-
cial statements, taken as a whole, have been presented in conformity with GAAP. Id. See
infra part II.A.6 for a discussion of GAAP and GAAS.
70. An auditor issues a disclaimer of opinion if he or she lacks enough information to form
an opinion or knows of any material departures from GAAP. Sturm, supra note 4, at 161.
71. Dodd, supra note 50, at 915 & n.32. An auditor may issue a clean report even if the
financial statements show that the client is losing money. Thus, a client can become insolvent
despite being issued a clean audit report. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Kean K. McDonald, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties: Unmanageable Risks of
Foreseeability, 57 DEF. COUNS. J. 194, 197 (1990). Although the expectation gap presents a
significant problem between auditors and the public, there generally exists no expectation gap
between an auditor and third-party investor or creditor. The Bily court said these third parties
"often possess considerable sophistication in analyzing financial information and are aware
from training and experience of the limits of an audit report.., that is... simply a broadly
phrased professional opinion based on a necessarily confined examination." Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 403, 834 P.2d 745, 765, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 71, modified, 3 Cal.
4th 1049a (1992).
75. McDonald, supra note 74, at 197; Chaffee, supra note 7, at 880-81.
76. See Chaffee, supra note 7, at 881.
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by-product of the audit, fraud actively concealed by a client can be diffi-
cult to detect due to the inherent limitations of the audit process."
In addition, the public often believes that auditors who issue "clean"
opinions guarantee a client's financial health as well as the prudence of
investment and loan decisions .7  This is simply not the case.
Even though audited financial statements present a composite of
numbers that reflect exact values, they are estimations that represent the
independent judgment of an auditor who applied professionally-accepted
accounting conventions such as sampling.79 Consequentially, auditing is
more than a "'mathematical exercise.' "o In reality, an audit is more
akin to art than science.
6. Professional standards
Auditors are expected to use the skill, care and competence exer-
cised by reasonably competent accountants under similar circum-
stances.81 Auditors also must comply with formal standards established
within the profession: generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
and generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). 2 GAAP is a compi-
lation of rules and procedures that define how financial information
should be presented. 3 GAAS are principles designed to guide the audit
77. See McDonald, supra note 74, at 198. One commentator described how a client could
perpetrate and hide a fraud from an auditor:
[A] company that wants to overstate its assets could either increase its accounts re-
ceivable by creating false sales documents or effectuate a double counting of the in-
ventory by transferring goods between locations during the observation phase of the
audit. In both cases, either by testing the accounts receivable or by varying the in-
ventory counting tests, an audit may uncover the fraud. On the other hand, as a
result of the combination of the auditors' professional judgment and the use of sam-
pling techniques, it is possible for a client's fraudulent misrepresentation to go unde-
tected by auditors despite following techniques that are accepted throughout the
profession.
Id, In some situations, a client's fraud may absolve an auditor of liability. For an excellent
discussion of the "insider fraud defense" see David B. Newdorf, Comment, Inside Fraud,
Outside Negligence and the Savings & Loan Crisis: When Does Management Wrongdoing Ex-
cuse Professional Malpractice?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1165 (1993).
78. Liggio, supra note 43, at 28.
79. Id. at 29. See infra part II.A.6 for a discussion of GAAP and GAAS.
80. Liggio, supra note 43, at 29 (quoting Phillip A. Loomis, Commissioner, SE).
81. Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104
(1962); George Donaldson, Accountants Liability: Professional Standards and the Securities
Laws, TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 38, 38.
82. Donaldson, supra note 81; see CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1972) (GAAS); RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ARRANGEMENTS, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 68, § 32 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1982) (GAAP).
83. Donaldson, supra note 81, at 38.
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process. 4 Specifically, GAAS governs how an auditor should obtain in-
formation for the audit report.
Courts generally hold that an auditor meets the requisite standard of
care if he or she has complied with GAAS and GAAP.8" However, one
court has held that GAAP and GAAS do not exclusively define the stan-
dard of care.8 6 Failure to comply with GAAP or GAAS is not negli-
gence per se,8 7 but a showing that an auditor failed to comply with
GAA-P or GAAS is strong evidence of a breach.88 Likewise, a material
misstatement may also create an inference that the auditor breached the
standard of care.89
B. Defining to Whom an Auditor Owes a Duty
1. Common law
An accountant cannot be held liable to a plaintiff absent a duty of
care flowing to the plaintiff. Courts have adopted three different rules
defining those to whom an auditor owes a duty of care: (1) privity; (2)
foreseeability; and (3) the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
a. privity
In the landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,9" the New
York high court was asked to determine whether an auditor could be
held liable to a noneient for negligently-audited financial statements that
caused only intangible economic injury. In Chief Judge Benjamin Car-
dozo's famous opinion, the court upheld a privity of contract require-
ment, holding that auditors owe a duty of care only to those who
contract for their services. 91
Driving Judge Cardozo's analysis in Ultramares was the recognition
that the accounting profession was uniquely exposed to potentially limit-
less liability from third parties.92 Judge Cardozo feared auditors would
84. William J. Casazza, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPAs Liable at Common Law to Cer-
tain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited Fi-
nancial Statements, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 337-38 (1985).
85. d at 339 (citing William H. Voltz, Accountant's Liability to Third Persons: Resistance
in Negligence, 9 BARRISTER, Fall 1982, at 31, 33).
86. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1636, 1646, 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474
(1990), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3
Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
87. Dodd, supra note 50, at 918.
88. Id. at 919.
89. Id.
90. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
91. Id. at 447-48.
92. Id. at 444.
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face "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class" for "a thoughtless slip or blunder" simply be-
cause of a "failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of decep-
tive entries. 93
In 1985 the New York Court of Appeals adopted a broader privity
requirement than Ultramares in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co. 94 The court held that an auditor owes a duty to noncients if the
auditor's relationship with them "sufficiently approaches privity."'
The court identified three prerequisites to establish this privity of
relationship: (1) The auditor must know that the audit will be used for a
particular purpose; (2) the auditor must act in a way calculated to induce
the nonclient's reliance;96 and (3) there must be conduct linking97 the
auditor to the party that demonstrates the auditor's understanding of the
nonclient's reliance.9" While this new rule is more flexible than the strict
privity requirement because it allows some nonclients to sue auditors, it
does not depart from the principles articulated in Ultramares.99
At least nine states follow privity rules similar to those announced
in either Ultramares or Credit Alliance."° In five of these states, the
judiciary has embraced privity. 1°0 In four states, legislatures have en-
acted privity statutes.1 0 2 In addition, federal courts have applied privity
93. Id.
94. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). Recently, New York reaffirmed this rule and the con-
trolling principles initially set forth in Ultramares in Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
95. Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 119. This relationship has been called "near privity."
See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 384, 834 P.2d 745, 752, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51,
58, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
96. The New York high court has interpreted this to mean that the auditor must be aware
of the "particular purpose" of the audit and act to achieve that purpose. Security Pacific, 597
N.E.2d at 1084.
97. The Bily court questioned whether the "linking" requirement should be necessary in
light of the auditor's knowledge that the audit was undertaken to benefit the third party. Bily,
3 Cal. 4th at 387-88, 834 P.2d at 754-55, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60-61.
98. Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 118 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 388-89, 834 P.2d at 755, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61. The Bily court
noted that the more recent cases have adopted the rule articulated in Credit Alliance. Id.
101. Id. These states are: Alabama, Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390
(Ala. 1989); Idaho, Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989);
Nebraska, Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989); New York,
Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d 110; and Pennsylvania, Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa.
1919).
102. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 388-89, 834 P.2d at 755, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61. These states are:
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie Supp. 1991); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
111, para. 5535.1 (Supp. 1992); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b) (1991); and Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (Supp. 1990).
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rules in three other states whose high courts have yet to consider the
issue. 103
b. foreseeability
In general, foreseeability permits recovery if the plaintiff's harm was
a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. 1°4 Despite
wide acceptance of the foreseeability rule for other torts, New Jersey, 10 5
Wisconsin 06 and Mississippi17 are currently the only states that allow
recovery in negligence actions against auditors based solely on
foreseeability. 08
In 1983 New Jersey became the first United States jurisdiction to
adopt the reasonable foreseeability standard in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Ad-
ler. 11 The court premised its holding on the availability of insurance, 110
the opinion that liability would deter negligent audits111 and the belief
that the auditor was in the best position to spread the risks of financial
losses.112
Before Bily, one district of the California Court of Appeal adopted
the foreseeability rule."1 3 The court in International Mortgage Co. v.
John P. Butler Accountancy Corp. 14 ruled that accountants could be held
liable to third parties who reasonably and foreseeably relied on negli-
gently audited financial statements. 1 5 The court noted that the public
policy factors it had articulated in Biakanja v. Irving" 6 supported a fore-
seeability rule."
7
103. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 388-89, 834 P.2d at 755, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61. Cases from these
states include: Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Indiana law);
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Delaware law); Stephens
Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado law).
104. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054-55 (N.Y. 1916).
105. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
106. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
107. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
108. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 390-91, 834 P.2d at 756-57, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62-63.
109. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
110. Id at 151.
111. Id at 152.
112. Id
113. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834
P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
114. Id.
115. Id
116. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). For a discussion of those factors, see infra notes
170-73 and accompanying text.
117. Butler, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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Some commentators have enthusiastically supported a foreseeability
rule, arguing that it serves important policy objectives such as deterrence
and cost spreading.11 However, only the Rosenblum court has predi-
cated its adoption of the foreseeability rule on the availability of insur-
ance, the prospects of deterrence and the efficiency in spreading the risk.
2. The Restatement approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts approach allows recovery by a
"limited group" of noneients, provided they qualify as an audit's in-
tended beneficiary.' 19 An intended beneficiary is a third party whom the
auditor intends to influence for a particular type of transaction. 120 How-
ever, if an auditor" 'merely knows of the ever-present possibility of repe-
tition to anyone,'" the auditor will bear no legal responsibility to the
nonclient for his or her negligence.
12 1
In adopting this rule, the American Law Institute (ALL) reasoned
that allowing all foreseeable nonclients to sue could cause accountants
118. See, e.g., Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233, 256 (1983) (stating that imposi-
tion of liability deters negligence and compensates injured parties).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
120. Id. § 552(2)(b). The Restatement provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it;
and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influ-
ence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
Id.
121. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 409-10, 834 P.2d 745, 770, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 51, 75 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (1977)), modified, 3 Cal.
4th 1049a (1992).
In many situations the identity of the person for whose guidance the information is
supplied is of no moment to the person who supplies it, although the number and
character of the persons to be reached and influenced, and the nature and extent of
the transaction for which guidance is furnished may be vitally important. This is
true because the risk of liability to which the supplier subjects himself by undertaking
to give the information, while it may not be affected by the identity of the person for
whose guidance the information is given, is vitally affected by the number and char-
acter of the persons, and particularly the nature and the extent of the proposed
transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 119, § 552 cmt. h.
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significant losses. 122 The ALI feared that auditors would respond to
broad liability by reducing audit services, thereby restricting the flow of
information "upon which the operation of the economy rests." 123 The
ALI also justified its approach on the ground that financial loss is sub-
stantially different from property or physical injury that results from
other types of negligence.1 24 These rationales echo the concerns that
Judge Cardozo expressed in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche-that foresee-
able liability is unfair because it is limitless.
1 25
The Restatement approach is more expansive than the Credit Alli-
ance rule because it does not require a link between the auditor and the
third party as a prerequisite to recovery. As a result, more third parties
have standing to sue the auditor under the Restatement. Many jurisdic-
tions favor the approach taken in the Restatement, viewing it as "a satis-
factory compromise between their discomfort with the traditional privity
approach and the 'specter of unlimited liability'" of the foreseeability
rule. 
126
III. BILY v ARTHUR YOUNG & Co. 127
A. The Facts
In 1980 Osborne Computer Corporation was formed, becoming the
first company to manufacture portable personal computers. 128 Two
years later, sales of its only product, the Osborne I Computer, had
reached $10 million per month, making it one of the fastest growing
companies in the history of American business.
1 29
In order to raise capital for its continued growth, Osborne contem-
plated and began planning for a public offering.1 30 In preparation, it en-
gaged Arthur Young & Company to audit its 1981 and 1982 financial
statements. 31 In early 1983, Arthur Young completed its audit and is-
122. See id. cmt. a.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 119, § 552; Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 394, 834 P.2d 745, 759, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 65 (quoting Briggs v. Sterner,
529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981)), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
127. 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
128. Id at 376, 834 P.2d at 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id at 377, 834 P.2d at 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53. Arthur Young's audit of Osborne
was performed years before any court in the United States had applied the foreseeability rule to
cases alleging accountant negligence. Arthur Young therefore had no reason to believe that it
might be held liable to unknown third parties.
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sued an unqualified audit opinion. 132  One hundred duplicates of the
opinion were hand-delivered to Osborne.
133
At the suggestion of its three investment banking underwriters, and
for reasons unrelated to the audit, Osborne delayed its initial public offer-
ing.1 34 Because of the delay, it needed operating capital to continue its
basic operations until the public offering could take place. 135 Using Ar-
thur Young's clean audit report, 136 Osborne solicited investors to provide
direct loans or letters of credit as security for bank loans.1 37 In return,
Osborne issued warrants to the investors entitling them to buy Osborne
stock at a price that was expected to return a sizable profit if and when
the offering took place.1 38 Osborne acquired additional capital by selling
stock held by a major shareholder.
1 39
As the transactions closed, Osborne's "performance began to fal-
ter.""4° Poor business planning and strong competition from IBM de-
railed the public offering. 41 Starved for capital, Osborne eventually fell
into insolvency, and the investor-creditors lost all of their money.
1 42
Later, the investors discovered weaknesses in Osborne's internal account-
ing procedures.143 In spite of these weaknesses, Arthur Young's 1982
132. Id. at 377, 834 P.2d at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54. See supra part II.A.4 for a description
of the audit report.
133. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 377, 834 P.2d at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. The dissent implicitly
recognized the significance of the fact that Arthur Young delivered 100 copies of the audit
report to Osborne, see id at 417, 834 P.2d at 774, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing), and noted that audits are frequently performed so that the client may solicit an invest-
ment or loan. Id. at 420, 834 P.2d at 776, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard argued that liability should flow from such knowledge, id., 834 P.2d at 776-
77, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82-83 (Kennard, J., dissenting), and that policy considerations sup-
ported liability, id at 420-30, 834 P.2d at 777-83, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83-89 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). Arthur Young anticipated that concern and argued: "[F]or all it appears, the 100
copies of the audited financial statements approximates the Osborne shareholders, senior em-
ployees and other 'insiders' who would be expected to receive copies of the financial state-
ments, and no evidence cited or of record suggests otherwise." Petition for Review at 6.
134. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 376-77, 834 P.2d at 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53. The offering was
delayed in part because of concerns associated with Osborne's new CEO and plans to replace
the Osborne I computer. Id.
135. Id.




140. Id. at 378, 834 P.2d at 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 377, 834 P.2d at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
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audit showed a $69,000 profit, although losses actually exceeded $3
million.1"
The stock and warrant investors sued Arthur Young for fraud, neg-
ligence and negligent misrepresentation. 45 After a lengthy trial, the jury
was instructed, pursuant to the foreseeability standard of Butler,14 6 that
"an accountant owes a... duty of care to those third parties who reason-
ably and forseeably [sic] rely on an audited financial statement prepared
by the accountant."' 47 Based on this language, the jury found Arthur
Young liable for over $4 million for professional negligence. 148
The California Court of Appeal readily acknowledged that if the
trial court had applied either the privity or the Restatement rules, the
plaintiff-investors and lenders would not have been able to recover be-
cause Arthur Young would not have owed them a duty.149 The appellate
court also held that the jury correctly considered Arthur Young's inter-
nal auditing manuals in determining whether Arthur Young fulfilled its
professional duties under GAAP and GAAS.' 50 This ruling allowed the
jury to consider standards of care independent of those established by
GAAS or GAAP.' 5'
Before the California Supreme Court, Arthur Young argued that
the state's adherence to a foreseeability standard would place it alone
among the major common-law commercial jurisdictions that had consid-
ered the issue since Butler.'52 With the exception of Mississippi,' the
scope of duty announced in Butler had been uniformly rejected in all
eighteen American jurisdictions that had considered the issue since But-
144. Id at 378, 834 P.2d at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
145. Id at 379, 834 P.2d at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
146. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834
P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992). See supra part II.B.l.b for a
discussion of the foreseeability rule.
147. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 379, 834 P.2d at 749, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55.
148. Id. Not all plaintiffs, however, were able to show reliance on the report, which was
necessary in order to recover. Id. at 378 n.2, 834 P.2d at 748 n.2, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 n.2.
149. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1636, 1650, 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 477




152. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218; Petition for Review at 1; see supra notes 25-
26 and accompanying text.
153. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
[Vol. 26:1335
June 1993] BILY v. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO. 1353
ler.154 After balancing competing policy considerations, the California
Supreme Court reversed, thus rejecting the foreseeability rule.
B. The Reasoning of the Court
Bily marks a significant shift in how California courts treat auditor
liability to third parties. The California Supreme Court's opinion limits
the duty owed by an auditor to reasonably foreseeable third parties who
rely on negligently audited financial statements with respect to three dif-
ferent torts: negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud."'5 The
court concluded that for each tort a different duty applied.
1. Negligence
To support their argument that a duty should extend to those other
than the client in auditor liability cases, the plaintiffs analogized to prod-
ucts liability cases, in which courts have found that a duty extends be-
yond the client.1 56  The court rejected this comparison for several
reasons. First, a manufacturer exercises complete control over the design
and manufacture of its product,1 57 whereas an auditor merely expresses
an opinion about financial statements that the client provided." 8
Additionally, the court recognized that third parties in auditor lia-
bility cases tend to be more sophisticated than third parties in products
liability cases.1 59 The court noted that those who read and rely on audit
reports prior to investing or lending money tend to "possess considerable
154. See Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Monco Agency, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. La. 1989), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'1 Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990); Frymire v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D.
Ill. 1987); Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 644 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ind. 1986), aff'd, 827
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Colonial
Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d'390 (Ala. 1989); First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell
& Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Idaho
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422
N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 81-82
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989); Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney,
822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d
1032 (1987), modified, 750 P.2d 254 (Wash.), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988); First
Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
155. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 376, 834 P.2d at 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
156. Id. at 401, 834 P.2d at 764, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 70.
157. Id.
158. IaL
159. Id. at 403, 834 P.2d at 765, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 71.
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sophistication in analyzing financial information." 1" These individuals
therefore know an audit report is simply a professional opinion based on
a limited examination. 6  The "presumptively powerless consumer" 162 in
the products liability case, who is unable to contractually allocate risk
with the manufacturer, stands in stark contrast to the investor or lender
who can contract with the auditor.1 63 Therefore, it is improper to analo-
gize auditor liability to products liability.
Finally, the court held that as a matter of policy third parties should
protect themselves by relying "on their own prudence, diligence, and
contracting power, as well as other information tools," rather than on
tort law.164 The court stated that this policy "promotes sound invest-
ment and credit practices and discourages the careless use of monetary
resources." 161 In addition, the court explained that if third parties could
recover against auditors for negligence, auditors would become insurers
of bad loans and investments.
1 66
Since its decision in Biakanja v. Irving,167 the California Supreme
Court has consistently rejected privity as a barrier to negligence actions
against professional suppliers of information.1 6  The court's decision in
Bily departs from that course by requiring that plaintiffs establish privity





163. Id. (quoting John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental
Tort Reform, 86 MIcH. L. RaV. 1929, 1956-57 (1988)).
164. Id.; see infra part III.B. l.b.
165. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 403, 834 P.2d at 765, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 71.
166. Id.
167. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
168. See id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19 (adopting balancing test to determine whether nonclient
third parties may sue notary public for negligence); see also Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d
335, 342, 556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976) (applying balancing test of policy
factors to determine whether nonclient third parties may sue attorney for negligence).
169. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 406, 834 P.2d at 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73. Negligence is conduct
that falls below the standard of care established for the protection of others. Id. at 396, 834
P.2d at 760, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 66. In California, liability for negligence is established by
statute. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993). The California Civil Code
provides:
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the man-
agement of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
Id.
The first requirement for a negligence cause of action is the existence of a duty. To deter-
mine whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty the court begins by looking to policy consid-
erations. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 397, 834 P.2d at 760, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 67 (" ' "'[D]uty' .. . is
... an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
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In Biakanja, the court identified a list of factors to determine
whether a duty should exist absent privity. 7 These factors include: (1)
whether a transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) whether the
injury was foreseeable; (3) whether the plaintiff was certain to suffer in-
jury; (4) whether there was a close relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injury; (5) whether the defendant's conduct
merits moral blame; and (6) whether future harm can be prevented.17 '
Applying these factors, the Bily court concluded that an auditor owes a
duty only to his or her client for negligence suits.' 72 The court premised
its holding on three concerns: (1) Finding that auditors owed a duty to
those other than their clients would disproportionately impose liability
on auditors; (2) a third party who intends to rely on an audit could seek
protection through contractual recitals; and (3) auditors and the public
would suffer negative consequences if auditors owed a duty to third
parties.1
73
a. disproportionate liability in negligence suits
In Bily the California Supreme Court reasoned that it would be un-
fair for auditors to owe a duty beyond the client for negligence because
auditors would suffer liability disproportionate to their fault. This find-
ing was premised on the client's control over the audit process, the com-
plexity of conducting an audit and the nature of the third-party damages.
First, the supreme court noted that clients control the audit process
in several important ways. Most importantly, the auditor typically relies
on the client for information. 174 The client usually provides the auditor
with a copy of its financial statements, over which the client has direct
control.175 The auditor also depends on the client for information about
its business and record-keeping systems.
176
In addition, clients control the dissemination of the audit report.
17 7
A client can distribute an opinion to almost any potential lender or inves-
tor quickly and easily. Auditors, therefore, have no real control over the
extent to which a report is spread and relied on by third parties.
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."' " (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968)).
170. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
171. Id.
172. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 406, 834 P.2d at 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
173. Id. at 398, 834 P.2d at 761, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 67.
174. Id. at 399, 834 P.2d at 762, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 400, 834 P.2d at 762, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68.
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Second, the court reasoned that the complexity of audits and the
high degree of professional judgment required to conduct an audit 178
make it unfair to impose liability on auditors for negligence to third
parties.179 The court noted that audit reports are not "simple statements
of verifiable fact... which can easily be checked against uniform stan-
dards of indisputable accuracy."18 Rather, they are professional opin-
ions that require evaluations of complex factors subject to differing
interpretations.1 8'
The court also questioned the reasonableness of third-party reliance
on audit reports as the sole aspect of a credit or investment decision. The
court stated that reasonable investors and lenders should "dig far deeper
in their 'due diligence' investigations than the surface level of an audi-
tor's opinion."1 82 Therefore, the court found that the complexity of au-
dit opinions and their role in investment and credit decisions supported a
more limited duty.
Finally, the court did not want to hold auditors liable for economic
losses associated with investment and credit decisions.183 To begin with,
the court recognized that if auditors owed a duty to investors and credi-
tors for negligently audited financial statements, they would be exposed
to vast liability." 4 In addition, the court did not believe that intangible
injuries to third parties warranted a more stringent duty because third
parties could protect themselves through private ordering.
b. private ordering
The court next addressed the ability of third-party investors and
lenders to allocate the risk of negligently audited financial statements
through private ordering. 185  A third party who intends to rely on an
audit report may contract with the audit client for a special security ar-
rangement or for improved terms.18 6 Alternatively, the third party can
become an intended beneficiary by insisting that the audit be conducted
on its behalf. 8 7 Lastly, the third party could personally inspect the cli-
178. Id., 834 P.2d at 763, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69.
179. Id at 406, 834 P.2d at 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
180. See id at 400, 834 P.2d at 763, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69.
181. Id.
182. Id at 401, 834 P.2d at 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
183. Id
184. Id at 402, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
185. Private ordering uses contract law rather than tort law to allocate the risks between
parties. Id at 398, 834 P.2d at 761, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 67.
186. Id. at 403, 834 P.2d at 765, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 71.
187. Id
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ent's financial statements or hire an auditor to conduct an audit on its
behalf. 8 In sum, private ordering allows third parties to establish a re-
lationship with an auditor to guarantee their standing to sue, or in the
alternative, to bargain for better terms.
Therefore, the court concluded that private ordering was a sufficient
alternative to tort liability for allocating the risk among the parties who
prepare and use audit reports.
c. consequences of a duty to third parties
The California Supreme Court next rebutted the arguments favoring
auditor liability to third parties. The proponents of expanded liability
contended that imposing a duty to third parties would deter negligent
audits, encourage more careful audits and provide an efficient way to
spread the risk associated with negligently audited financial state-
ments.1 89 The court rejected each of these arguments.
The court found that a duty to third parties would not deter negli-
gent audits.' 90 It reasoned that regardless of the audit's quality, auditors
would consider themselves targets of third parties any time a client went
bankrupt.191 In response, auditors could decrease audit services for in-
dustries with high failure rates, thereby reducing the amount of financial
information available to the public. 192
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that imposing a
duty to protect third parties would improve the quality of audits, noting
that it had not seen any empirical data to support that argument.1 93 Fur-
ther, in light of the complexities of conducting an audit, 94 the court
questioned whether it was possible for audits to be conducted more accu-
rately without increasing costs and thus decreasing availability. 95
Finally, the court expressed doubt that auditors are the parties best
able to absorb losses.' 96 It noted that investors and lenders can limit
their losses by diversifying their investments and loans.' 97
188. Id.
189. Id
190. Id. at 427, 834 P.2d at 781, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
191. Id. at 404, 834 P.2d at 766, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 72.
192. Id.
193. Id
194. See supra part II.A.
195. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 404, 834 P.2d at 766, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 72 (citing John A.
Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. Rnv.
1929, 1963-68 (1988)).
196. Id at 405, 834 P.2d at 766, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 72.
197. Id.
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2. Negligent misrepresentation
In addition to negligence, the court considered the extent to which
auditors owe a duty to nonelients for the separate tort of negligent mis-
representation.198 A negligent misrepresentation is a false statement, 199
honestly made, but without reasonable grounds.2°
While negligence focuses on an auditor's due care and adherence to
professional standards, negligent misrepresentation concerns the veracity
of representations in an audit report and a plaintiff's actual and justifi-
able reliance on that report.201 The court noted that "the distinction is
important" due to practical considerations at trial, such as the burden of
proof.
20 2
The California Supreme Court adopted the rule articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.20 3 This rule allows a plaintiff to recover if
the plaintiff was within the class of persons that the audit was intended to
benefit for a particular transaction known to the auditor °.2  A plaintiff
falls within this class as long as the auditor manifested an intent to bene-
fit the plaintiff as a member of a "narrow and circumscribed" group of
third parties for a specific transaction.205 The auditor is not liable to
other third parties even if he or she should have known that the third
party would rely on his or her report.20 6 The court reasoned that liability
is fair if the auditor accepted responsibility for "influencing particular
business transactions involving third persons," but unfair if the auditor
has not done so.
20 7
The court adopted the Restatement rule to ensure that auditors have
"notice of potential third party claims. '20 8 Because every client has a
different risk potential,20 9 notice of potential third-party plaintiffs allows
an auditor to assess its potential liability before accepting an engagement.
198. Id at 407, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
199. An audit opinion is a statement for purposes of negligent misrepresentation. Id. at
407-08, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
200. Id at 407, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74 (citing 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 720, at 819 (9th ed. 1988)).
201. Id at 413, 834 P.2d at 772, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. The court criticized courts, com-
mentators and the Restatement drafters for failing to clearly distinguish between the two. Id.
at 407, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
202. Id
203. Id. at 414, 834 P.2d at 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
204. See supra part lI.B. 1.b.
205. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 408, 834 P.2d at 768, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
206. Id
207. Id., 834 P.2d at 769, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
208. Id at 408-09, 834 P.2d at 769, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75.
209. Chaflee, supra note 7, at 892.
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In addition, the Restatement approach satisfied the court's concern
with attenuated causal links and false claims of reliance by nonclients.210
The court recognized that an auditor's knowledge of third-party reliance
on a specific transaction established a "closer connection" between the
negligent act and injury, "thereby ameliorating the otherwise difficult
concerns of causation and of credible evidence of reliance." '211
3. Fraud
An auditor who knowingly submits a false opinion makes an inten-
tional misrepresentation and commits fraud.212 Specific knowledge that
a statement is false is not required for fraud.21 3 Rather, an auditor can
commit fraud by making a statement without a belief in its truth or by
making it recklessly, not knowing whether the statement is true or
false.
214
The policy rationales driving the court to limit auditor liability to
third parties for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not justi-
fied in fraud cases.215 The court explained that "the moral force of the
argument against unlimited liability for mere errors or oversights and the
uncertain connection between investment and credit losses and the audi-
tor's report pale as policy factors when intentional misconduct is in
issue."
2 16
In fraud cases, courts have held auditors liable to third parties who
proved representations were made with the intent to defraud them.21 7
Plaintiffs must show that their reliance on the audit report was foresee-
able to the accountant.21 8
210. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 409, 834 P.2d at 769, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 415, 834 P.2d at 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. This Note uses the terms "inten-
tional misrepresentation" and "fraud" interchangeably.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 414-15, 834 P.2d at 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Bily Was Correctly Decided
1. The foreseeability rule will not significantly improve
the quality of audits
An auditor's desire to charge a premium for his or her services pro-
vides quality incentive. Because audit reports are necessarily based on
professional judgment and statistical sampling, expanding tort liability
will not increase this incentive.2" The uncertainty and imprecision in-
herent in the auditing process, coupled with the high degree of client
control over financial statements, means that there will always be a mar-
gin of error in audit opinions. 2 Spending more time conducting audits
and increasing statistical samples will not mitigate the impact of client
control and sampling error. Thus, an expansion of an auditor's tort lia-
bility will not significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of audits.
2. The foreseeability rule gives a windfall to third parties
If parties who are neither clients nor intended beneficiaries could
recover from the auditor for negligence, auditors would be turned into
investment insurers to a potentially infinite group of third parties who
paid nothing for the auditing services. Because audit reports can be inex-
pensively reproduced and circulated, third parties have an opportunity to
use them free of charge.221 If an investment or loan turns bad, a third-
party investor can try to recover it by suing the auditor. As a result, far-
removed third parties can reap the full benefits of successful investments
and enjoy some protection against bad investments at the auditor's ex-
pense. Thus, under a foreseeability rule third parties may get a windfall.
In addition, this rule would provide creditors and investors with an illog-
ical and judicially established incentive to "relax their efforts to control
the risks inherent in the[ir] transaction[s].
' 222
Without the liability limitations of privity or the Restatement, audi-
tors are forced to bear the costs associated with the risk of liability to
third parties or pass them on to clients. Forcing auditors to insure third-
party investments is unfair and ineffective. If auditors pass increased fees
to clients, clients are likely to pass them to consumers. It is also inequita-
219. See supra part II.A.1-6.
220. See supra part II.A.1-6.
221. It is not feasible to charge these third parties for the use of an audit report primarily
because it may be impossible to determine their identities.
222. Eric R. Fenel, Comment, Rebuilding the Citadel: State Legislative Responses to Ac-
countant Non-Privity Suits, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 863, 879 (1989).
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ble to force consumers to subsidize corporate investment risks because
they do not share in the profits from third-party investments.
3. Insurance is not an efficient way to spread risks or protect auditors
Auditors are free to purchase insurance to insulate themselves
against the more extensive liability of the foreseeability rule. However,
the "vast majority" of auditors sued belong to small- or medium-sized
accounting firms.223 The professional liability insurance squeeze is most
likely to affect these firms-causing them either to drop insurance or
stop auditing.224 Presumably, uninsured accountants are generally not in
a position to pay large damage awards. Consequently, these auditors are
less able to satisfy judgments. In turn, the lack of insurance under a
foreseeability rule means that auditors can neither efficiently spread risk
nor compensate injured third parties.
221
Insurance premiums are based on the degree of potential loss and
the predictability of the risk.226 If liability is uncertain, premiums are
increased.227 By reasonably limiting liability to nonelients, liability be-
comes more certain and insurance premiums are likely to stabilize.228
The privity and Restatement rules the court has articulated do this.
Bily limits liability and makes it more predictable. Because there is a
nonprofit, industry-created insurance carrier for auditors,229 the market
may respond quickly to the reduction in liability by lowering insurance
premiums.
4. Bily provides certainty
Bily's clearly defined spheres of liability make liability to third par-
ties predictable. Consequently, parties to financial transactions can make
better informed decisions. For example, a party who intends to invest or
extend credit and is neither a client nor an intended beneficiary, knows
that a private contract may be desirable.230 Alternatively, an investor
may forego standing to sue the auditor, and instead seek better invest-
ment or credit terms with the client. The auditor also knows the extent
223. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 32.
224. Fend, supra note 222, at 882.
225. Causey, supra note 17, at 415.
226. Fend, supra note 222, at 882.
227. Id.
228. Deborah E. Cooper, Accountants"Liability: Privity Rule is Necessary in Today's Mar-
ketplace, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 1990, at 7.
229. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
230. See infra part IV.B.1.
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of risk undertaken and can set fees and make appropriate insurance ar-
rangements prior to the engagement. This predictability and certainty
will translate into less litigation because parties will know their rights
and responsibilities prior to an audit.
5. Foreseeable liability impinges upon the amount and quality of
financial information
Auditors are likely to respond to foreseeable liability by performing
fewer audits, thereby reducing the amount and quality of financial infor-
mation available to investors and creditors.2 31 In fact, this has happened.
A nationwide survey found that accounting firms are cutting back on
services and turning clients away in order to reduce their exposure to
liability.2 32 From a policy perspective, the free flow of financial infor-
mation is more important than compensating for a third party's lost
investment.233 Because foreseeability impinges on the free flow of vital
financial information, it should be rejected.
B. Bily's Implications 
2 34
As comprehensive as the Bily decision is, some questions remain
unanswered: (1) How will Bily affect business transactions? (2) How
will the decision impact an auditor's professional standards? (3) Are
there permissible suits for negligence by nonclients? (4) How will courts
interpret who qualifies as an intended beneficiary? and (5) How will Bily
affect a case's settlement value?
1. Bily's effect on business transactions
The California Supreme Court's decision in Bily was a "welcome
break" from court decisions that have recently expanded auditor liabil-
ity.235 In addition to protecting auditors from liability to certain third
parties, it is likely to have several other consequences. According to one
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 119, § 552 cmt. a.
232. Nelson, supra note 17, at 37.
233. See Cooper, supra note 228, at 7.
234. This Note does not explore Bily's impact on negligence and negligent misrep-
resentation suits against professional suppliers of information other than accountants.
However, the rules articulated in Bily are likely to be applied to attorneys, architects, engineers
and abstractors. Popofsky et al., supra note 36, at 7.
235. Morris, supra note 11, at 1; Popofsky et al., supra note 36, at 7 ("Ernst & Young
[formerly Arthur Young & Co.], and the entire accounting profession, recently achieved a
significant victory [with the Bily decision].").
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commentator, Bily is likely to change the manner in which creditors and
investors do business with accountants.236
Specifically, nonclient creditors and investors who intend to rely on
audits will now have the "burden and incentive" to privately order their
risk.237 This is currently the case in New York, where a nonclient who
intends to rely on an audit will seek a contractual recital or express ac-
knowledgment from an auditor in conjunction with a particular transac-
tion.238 This allows the nonclient to sue the auditor in the event the
financial statements are negligently audited. However, the auditor's ex-
posure to liability is justified because the auditor has notice of the non-
client's intent to rely and can therefore decide whether to accept the
engagement.
One open question regarding private ordering, however, is whether
it is a real alternative for small or unsophisticated investors. If small or
unsophisticated investors purchase securities on an exchange, they may
recover from the auditor by virtue of federal securities laws.2 39 Bily is
relevant to transactions that do not invoke federal securities or state Blue
Sky laws.2' The small investor can avoid the risks of a negligent audit
by not investing in companies that do not conduct audits on the inves-
tor's behalf. Companies eager for capital from small investors can make
contractual arrangements with the auditor to account for the small inves-
tor. Consequently, the small investor would not need to privately con-
tract with the auditor to ensure his or her right to sue for negligently
audited financial statements. Alternatively, investors or creditors may
use the lack of a recital or acknowledgment from an auditor to bargain
for more favorable terms from the client.
Unsophisticated investors are treated differently. To recover for
negligent misrepresentation, a third party must show justifiable reliance
236. Popofsky et al., supra note 36, at 7.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 230-32 (1988) (holding that defrauded buyer of securities must prove that
omitted fact would have been considered significant by reasonable investor to recover under
10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (holding that buyer of securities
must prove seller intended to defraud to recover under lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (holding that defrauded buyers and sellers of securities
have implied private cause of action under lOb-5).
240. "Blue Sky laws" are state securities laws that were designed to prevent "'speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky."' Therese H. Maynard, The
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" is "Uniform?"--An Evaluation and
Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 359 n.4 (1987) (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917)).
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on the audited financial statements. 24 1 Because unsophisticated investors
by definition will not understand complicated financial statements, they
cannot show the justifiable reliance necessary to recover.242
2. The professional standard of care
Bily leaves another question unanswered. The California Supreme
Court granted review only to consider whether and to what extent an
auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable third parties who
detrimentally rely on negligently audited financial statements.243 Inter-
estingly, the court did not grant review on the appellate court's second
major holding, that it is proper for juries to consider factors other than
an auditor's compliance with GAAS and GAAP to determine whether
an auditor acted negligently.
The appellate court's decision is significant because it was the first
time a court subjected an auditor to negligence liability in spite of com-
pliance with GAAP and GAAS. 2 44 This holding is inconsistent with
California law and unsupported by public policy.245
a. going beyond GAAP and GAAS
At trial the plaintiffs introduced Arthur Young's internal auditing
manuals, which detailed procedures that its auditors followed, as evi-
dence of the standard of care.246 The internal procedures were more
241. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 412-13, 834 P.2d 745, 772, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 51, 77-78, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
242. Id. at 403-04 n.13, 834 P.2d at 765 n.13, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 71 n.13. The court stated:
If a third party possesses sufficient financial sophistication to understand and appre-
ciate the contents of audit reports ... he or she should also be aware of their limita-
tions and of the alternative ways of privately ordering the relevant risks. If, on the
other hand, a third party lacks the threshold knowledge to understand the audit
report and its terms, he or she has no reasonable basis for reliance.
Id
243. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 798 P.2d 1214, 274 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1990).
244. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 48; see, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that auditor's good faith compliance with GAAS relieved auditor of negligence
liability); In re Hawaii Corp., 567 F. Supp. 609, 617 (D. Haw. 1983) (holding that absent
intentional misrepresentation auditor meets standard of care by complying with GAAP and
GAAS). See supra part II.A.6 for a discussion of GAAP and GAAS.
245. See, eg., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986) (stating that auditor's ordinary skill and competence is
defined by GAAP and GAAS), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834
P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
246. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1636, 1645-49, 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474-
76 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, modified,
3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
BILY v. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.
rigorous than those in GAAP and GAAS. 7 Over Arthur Young's ob-
jection, the jury was instructed that it "may" consider GAAP and
GAAS "among other evidence" to determine if the standard of care had
been met.248 This instruction permitted the jury to disregard GAAP and
GAAS entirely and find Arthur Young negligent based on other
standards.249
On appeal Arthur Young argued that, as a matter of law, GAAP
and GAAS conclusively define an auditor's standard of care.250 The
court of appeal disagreed, holding that an auditor could be subject to a
standard of care independent from GAAP and GAAS.25' The court first
reasoned that GAAP and GAAS could not provide appropriate guidance
in every conceivable situation, and therefore the jury should be allowed
to consider other standards.252 Second, the court reasoned that the ac-
counting profession should not exclusively set its own standards of
care.
253
Assuming GAAP and GAAS were inapplicable to a particular situ-
ation, the broad principles embodied within them can nevertheless be
used to gauge whether an auditor was negligent.254 There-is no need to
go beyond these standards simply because the GAAP and GAAS draft-
ers did not envision a specific situation. Further, because neither the trial
nor the appellate court believed that a unique auditing situation was even
at issue, the court was not justified in going beyond GAAP and GAAS.
Accordingly, the jury should have considered only whether Arthur
Young's performance met the standard of care established in GAAP and
GAAS.
The court of appeal's second rationale, that the accounting profes-
sion should not be trusted to set its own standards of care, is also faulty.
While juries are well suited to establish standards of care for certain in-
dustries based on their everyday experiences, the ordinary jury is not
equipped to understand the complexities of an audit as evinced by the
"expectation gap. '25 Without an instruction limiting the standard of
247. See id. Arthur Young's manual required it to assign a "concurring partner" although
GAAS has no such requirement. L. at 1649, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
248. Id. at 1645-46, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
249. Id. at 1648, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 476. For example, plaintiff Bily's counsel told the jury to
use its common sense in determining if Arthur Young was negligent "'irrespective of GAAS
and GAAP."' Id. (quoting plaintiff Bily's counsel).
250. Id.
-251. Id.
252. Id., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
253. Id
254. See id.
255. See supra part II.A.5.
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care to GAAP and GAAS, the jury's decision-making process will be
infected by its heightened expectations of what auditors should detect. If
an auditor did not discover material misrepresentations in a client's fi-
nancial statements despite compliance with widely-accepted professional
standards, a jury could nevertheless hold the auditor liable.
Further, in determining whether an auditor's conduct met the stan-
dard of care, a jury is not entitled to subjectively create its own standard;
it must hear evidence of the professional standard of care through expert
testimony.256 This testimony is used to determine whether the auditor
performed with ordinary skill and competence.25 7 Accountants, acting
as expert witnesses, will always be used to establish ordinary skill and
competence. In addition, if courts allow parties to articulate a standard
of care different from GAAP and GAAS, juries will be free-and may
even be encouraged by plaintiffs-to allow their own higher expectations
to impact their decision making. In effect, auditors would be held to
standards defined by the public's expectations of auditing, which may be
excessive and inaccurate. By allowing the parties to articulate a standard
of care more rigorous than GAAP and GAAS, the trial and appellate
court decisions demonstrated a misunderstanding of the auditing process
that unfairly exposed auditors to liability.
When testifying, expert witnesses will assess whether the auditor's
conduct met or failed to meet the professional standard.258 Because
GAAP and GAAS are the only standards recognized throughout the ac-
counting profession, expert witnesses must necessarily refer to the
GAAP and GAAS standards in their testimony.259 Therefore, testimony
could not reasonably be based on anything but GAAP and GAAS.2 6°
GAAP and GAAS should exclusively define an auditor's standard
of care. Unlike other professions, audit report users have specific expec-
tations of the standard of care that an auditor will exercise.261 It is com-
monly understood by those who use audit reports that audits are
conducted in compliance only with GAAP and GAAS.2 62 In fact, the
256. See Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101,
104 (1962).
257. Id.
258. Petition for Review at 19.
259. Id. This does not mean that experts will agree on interpretation of GAAS and GAAP.
Expert witnesses may try to establish higher or lower standards of care based on the GAAP
and GAAS framework.
260. Id.
261. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 49.
262. Id.
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audit report itself proclaims compliance only with GAAP and GAAS. 2 6 3
Thus, the client has notice that these are the standards being used and
has no reasonable basis for believing an auditor will comply with higher
standards. Further, these standards are widely published, discussed and
available to those who rely on audit reports.26" Therefore, because third
parties know what standard of care to expect, and make investment deci-
sions accordingly, auditors should not be held to a different standard.
In addition, courts should use the standards set forth in GAAP and
GAAS because they provide certainty. Auditors should not be held to
other, unknown and undefined standards. Otherwise, auditors will be
less able to predict conduct that can result in liability.
Finally, by extending the standard of care beyond GAAP and
GAAS, courts risk holding auditors to standards for which they may
lack the competence to comply. For example, a court might require an
auditor to detect fraud, rather than to simply search for it.265 Auditors
may be unable to do this because of the inherent nature of the auditing
process.2 66 While hindsight may be useful for determining whether the
standards within GAAP and GAAS should be changed, it is unfair to
impose higher standards on an auditor after an audit has been con-
ducted.2 67 Auditors should therefore be held only to the standards de-
fined by GAAP and GAAS.
b. internal manuals and the standard of care
Permitting internal manuals to establish a different standard of care
will do little to improve the quality of audits. Accounting firms should
be encouraged, even applauded, for setting higher standards of conduct
than those required by GAAP and GAAS. Instead, the trial and ap-
pellate courts, in effect, punished Arthur Young for setting higher
standards.
To avoid exposure to liability, accounting firms are likely to adopt
internal procedures that reflect the lowest acceptable professional stan-
dards of care. While public policy dictates that courts should encourage
auditors to adopt a high standard of care, basing the higher standard of
care on internal manuals will actually encourage, and reward, lower in-
263. See supra part II.A.4.
264. Brief of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 49.
265. See supra part II.A.5.
266. See supra part II.A.5.
267. See Liggio, supra note 43, at 31.
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ternal standards of care. Consequently, firms will lack incentive to set
standards higher than GAAP and GAAS.
In addition, the court of appeal's ruling creates a double standard.
Whereas one firm could be held negligent for failing to follow its internal
procedures, another firm" Whose internal manuals did not set similar stan-
dards could be exonerated for the same conduct. As a result, larger
firms, which typically use internal manuals, may be held to higher stan-
dards than smaller firms, which typically do not use them.2 68 This
double standard is unfair. Clients engage larger firms because of their
expertise or their ability to add credibility to their financial statements
not because they have and use internal manuals. Those who use and rely
on audit reports know precisely the standards with which auditors com-
ply-GAAP and GAAS. Allowing an investor or creditor to recover for
a bad investment based on standards other than GAAP and GAAS will
discourage firms from adopting higher standards and will inequitably
punish large firms that do.
3. Recovery by contractual third-party beneficiaries
The court in Bily held that "an auditor's liability for general negli-
gence in the conduct of an audit of its client's financial statements is
confined to the client. ' 269 The court also ruled that others "may not
recover on a pure negligence theory. ' 270 However, the court declined to
address whether it would treat contractual third-party beneficiaries as
the legal equivalent of clients for purposes of negligence suits. 271 The
court noted that "[t]hird party beneficiaries may under appropriate cir-
cumstances possess the same rights as parties to the contract. ' 272 Unfor-
tunately, this statement sheds no light on whether a third-party
beneficiary will be allowed to sue for negligence.
Section 1559 of the California Civil Code provides: "A contract,
made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him
at any time before the parties thereto rescind it."'273 To prove that one is
a third-party beneficiary, one must show more than that "the contracting
parties acted against a backdrop of knowledge that the [third party]
268. Petition for Review at 19.
269. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 406, 834 P.2d 745, 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
51, 73.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 406 n.16, 834 P.2d at 767 n.16, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73 n.16.
272. Id.
273. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 1982).
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would derive benefit from the agreement. '274 Rather, the contracting
parties must have affirmatively sought to benefit the third person, and
such a benefit must have been a "motivating factor in the parties' deci-
sion to enter into the contract." 275
If courts allow third-party beneficiaries to recover for negligence,
nonclients would attempt to portray themselves as third-party benefi-
ciaries so they could also recover for negligence. 276 It is easier for third
parties to prove negligence than negligent misrepresentation because the
focus of the case is on the auditor's breach of a standard of care rather
than on the third party's reasonable reliance on the audit report. In neg-
ligence cases the court seems more willing to presume a client's reli-
ance-principally because the client was the one who commissioned the
audit with the intention to rely on it.277 This presumption would be un-
dermined if nonclients could sue for negligence. In fact, if nonclients-
otherwise qualifying as intended beneficiaries-could sue for negligence,
there would be little, if any, reason for the court's adoption of the Re-
statement approach-limiting nonclients to suits for negligent misrepre-
sentation. Therefore, intended beneficiaries, otherwise qualifying as
third-party beneficiaries, should not be allowed to sue for negligence.
4. The intended beneficiary
One commentator has suggested that Bily will "create a lot of litiga-
tion over precisely who auditors were aware of, and over what type of
knowledge is required to impose liability. '278 In other words, California
case law has yet to define precisely who qualifies as an intended benefici-
274. Eastern Aviation Group v. Airborne Express, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 1453, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 355, 358 (1992) (quoting Corrugated Paper Prods. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d
908, 912 (7th Cir. 1989)).
275. Id. (quoting Corrugated Paper Prods. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d 908, 912 (7th
Cir. 1989)). "Third-party beneficiary" is a contract law term. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
CoNTRAcTs §§ 10.1-.3 (2d ed. 1990). In contrast, "intended beneficiary" is a tort law term.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 119, § 552. This Note does not attempt
to explain the difference, if any, between the two terms. Rather, this Note explores the possible
effects of an audit's intended beneficiary attempting to qualify as a third-party beneficiary in an
effort to circumvent Bily's rule that noncients may not sue for negligence.
276. A third party could do this by showing that its use of the audit report was a "motivat-
ing factor" behind the audit engagement. Because an intended beneficiary's reliance on an
audit report can be a "motivating factor" for the engagement-the client usually wants an
investment or loan-it may not be difficult for intended beneficiaries to qualify as contractual
third-party beneficiaries.
277. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 413, 834 P.2d at 772, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. The court noted that
"[t]he reliance element [for negligence instructions] is only implicit" and is considered as part
of the overall causation evaluation. Id.
278. Morris, supra note 11, at 10.
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ary. This point is well taken. Interpretations of the Restatement section
552 vary according to jurisdiction.279 For example, one Texas decision
interpreted the Restatement very broadly.28 °
In order to comport with the spirit of Bily and the comments to the
Restatement, California courts are likely to require that the auditor have
knowledge of the third party's reliance before an audit takes place. In
Bily, the court noted that the Restatement "does not seek to probe the
state of mind of the accountant." 281 Instead, the court concluded that an
intended beneficiary is one whom an auditor seeks to supply with infor-
mation for a transaction with "sufficiently specific economic parameters
to permit" the auditor to assess whether or not to accept an engage-
ment.282 Thus, to keep with the spirit of Bily, California courts should
require proof that an auditor entered into an engagement knowing and
intending a third party to rely on the audit report for a specific
transaction.
A more relaxed requirement would, in essence, emulate a foresee-
ability rule. Had the Bily court wanted to adopt the foreseeability rule it
simply would have afirmed the lower court's decision. It did not. In-
stead, the court analyzed in detail the reasons auditors should have
knowledge of third-party reliance before courts impose liability on them.
279. See, eg., Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 593 (D. Haw. 1983) (holding that lawyer
had no duty to disclose material facts unless he or she knew third parties would rely on ad-
vice); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1176 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (holding that Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), dictates that only third parties known by accountant as
prospective user of audit may recover for negligence); Chun v. Park, 462 P.2d 905, 909 (Haw.
1969) (holding that title company's duty of reasonable care extended to buyers and lending
bank in which seller informed title company of other party's identity); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248
N.W.2d 291, 302 (Minn. 1976) (holding that accountants are liable because they had actual
knowledge of third-party reliance); BancOhio Nat'l Bank v. Schiesswohl, 515 N.E.2d 997, 999
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding that no liability exists when third party was not specifically
foreseen); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that "less restrictive interpretation" of § 552 should be applied).
280. Blue Bell, 715 S.W.2d at 412. In Blue Bell a Texas appellate court held that an auditor
will be liable to third parties if the auditor "knows or should know that such statements will be
relied upon by a limited class of persons." Id. Although the court said it was applying the
Restatement, its use of the "should know" language bears little practical difference to the
foreseeability rule.
281. Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 409, 834 P.2d at 769, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75.
282. Id. The Restatement adds that the auditor must " 'manifest[ ] an intent to supply the
information for the sort of use in which plaintiff's loss occurs.' "Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 119, § 552 cmt. a).
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5. Settlement value
The nuisance value of a lawsuit gives it a settlement value independ-
ent of its merits.283 This premise applies forcefully in the context of audi-
tor liability. Negligence suits are easily filed and are "virtually
impossible to end." '284 In filing a lawsuit, a plaintiff has a minimal bur-
den of showing an injury.28 ' In addition, a suit fied against a profes-
sional accountant is likely to "cloud [the auditor's] professional
reputation" and "threat[en his or her] professional standing. ' 286 One
commentator has noted that the "in terrorem effect" of such suits create
a settlement value "having no relationship to the size or merit of the
claim." 287 The commentator also noted that because auditor liability is-
sues are complex and difficult to litigate, cases against auditors can yield
an even higher settlement value.288
In the absence of a rule limiting an auditor's liability to noncients,
an auditor may be exposed to "vexatious litigation" that is "virtually
limitless. '28 9 By allowing only the client to sue for negligence and only
an intended beneficiary to sue for negligent misrepresentation, Bily de-
creases the settlement value of suits initiated by many third parties. Be-
cause a case filed by a nonclient, non-intended beneficiary will be easily
dismissed under Bily, it follows that such cases have little, if any, settle-
ment value.
Bily, of course, does not affect the settlement value of cases initiated
by clients and intended beneficiaries-nor should it. One of the main
policy justifications for Bily is that auditors have notice at the time of the
party's engagement of who would have standing to sue and the nature of
the transactions for which they could sue.29 °
283. See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 CoLUM. L. REv.
1308 (1934).
284. Cooper, supra note 228, at 7. One reason for this is that a plaintiff who pleads reliance
"however groundless" will have "an excellent chance of surviving a motion to dismiss." Id.
285. Newton N. Minow, Accountants'Liability and the Litigation Explosion, J. ACCT., Sept.
1984, at 70, 71-72.




290. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 414, 834 P.2d 745, 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
51, 79, modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
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V. RECOMMENDATION: THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SHOULD
CODIFY BILY AND RECOGNIZE GAAP AND GAAS As
CONCLUSIVELY DEFINING AN AUDITOR'S
STANDARD OF CARE
The day after the California Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Bily, the powerful California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA),
allied with the banking lobby, persuaded Senator McCorquodale to in-
troduce a bill in the California Legislature to reverse the ruling.2 9 1 An-
ticipating the court's holding, the CTLA and the banking lobby had
prepared language to overturn the decision: "A licensee owes a duty of
ordinary care and shall be liable to reasonably foreseeable persons for his
or her negligence or.other tortious conduct." '292 The amendment was
then added to a bill-in this case Senate bill 1900 that concerned mos-
quito abatement.293 The Assembly approved the bill with little discus-
sion, 294 but a senator objected to it on technical grounds-that state law
requires amendments to bills be germane.295 The Senate killed the bill.2 96
Nevertheless, there are plans to introduce to the California Legislature
another bill that would overturn Bily.2 97
The California Legislature should not overturn Bily. To the con-
trary, the legislature should codify Bily and clarify the ambiguities that
were not addressed by the California Supreme Court. Specifically, the
legislature should prohibit negligence suits by all nonclients. This will
stop nonclients from circumventing Bily by casting themselves as con-
tractual third parties in an effort to sue for negligence. Most impor-
tantly, however, the legislature should regard auditor compliance with
GAAP and GAAS as per se reasonable. As it now stands, Bily allows
juries to completely ignore the comprehensive standards of care devel-
oped within the accounting profession and apply wholly independent fac-
tors to gauge the reasonableness of an auditor's conduct.2 98 As a result,
juries may measure an auditor's performance against their own height-
291. Bill Ainsworth, Capitol Abuzz Over Accountantr Trial Lawyers Acted Fast to Restore
Auditor Liability Following Thursday Ruling but Lost on Technicality, RECORDER, Sept. 3,
1992 at 1; see S. 1900, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
292. S. 1900, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1992) (section 4).
293. Id




298. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1636, 1645-49, 271 Cal. Rptr. 470,
474-76 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51,
modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
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ened expectations,299 thereby undermining the rule that expert testimony
establish the professional standard of care.3"o
By opening the doors to standards independent of GAAP and
GAAS, an auditor lacks notice of the conduct for which he or she could
be liable. Additionally, if juries determine liability independent of
GAAP and GAAS, the benefits of uniformity will be undermined.
Therefore, auditors should not be held to higher, unknown and undeter-
minable standards of care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because accountants audit financial statements involving hundreds
of billions of dollars every year,30 1 the legal and economic ramifications
of auditor liability to third parties are far-reaching. Over sixty years ago
Judge Cardozo recognized the problems of limitless liability in U-
tramares. Today those concerns are even more serious because audit re-
ports involve more money and can be circulated to more people than
Judge Cardozo could have imagined.
Bily does not give auditors an arbitrary advantage by limiting their
liability. Rather, it strikes the proper balance between traditional princi-
ples of tort law and the realities of the modern marketplace. Auditors
who commit fraud are and should be liable to any party they intend to
deceive. But public policy compels a more limited scope of liability for
mere errors and oversights.
For these reasons, the California Legislature should codify Bily and
answer the questions that the California Supreme Court left open.30 2 But
most importantly, the legislature should tie the auditor's standard of care
exclusively to GAAP and GAAS so that auditors have notice of the con-
duct for which they may be held liable. By doing so, the legislature will
fairly apportion liability without undercutting commercial relationships.
In the end this is the best approach for auditors, those who use audit
reports and the general public.
Scott Vick *
299. See supra part II.A.5.
300. See Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101
(1962).
301. Petition for Review at 2.
302. See supra part IV.B.
* For her continual encouragement and support, I dedicate this Note to the most impor-
tant person in my life, my wife Laura. I am also grateful to Professor Therese Maynard for her
sage advice and unending enthusiasm.
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